Supreme Court of The United States; Riley v, California

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

RILEY v. CALIFORNIA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

No. 13–132. Argued April 29, 2014—Decided June 25, 2014*

In No. 13–132, petitioner Riley was stopped for a traffic violation,

which eventually led to his arrest on weapons charges. An officer

searching Riley incident to the arrest seized a cell phone from Riley’s

pants pocket. The officer accessed information on the phone and no-

ticed the repeated use of a term associated with a street gang. At the

police station two hours later, a detective specializing in gangs fur-

ther examined the phone’s digital contents. Based in part on photo-

graphs and videos that the detective found, the State charged Riley

in connection with a shooting that had occurred a few weeks earlier

and sought an enhanced sentence based on Riley’s gang membership.

Riley moved to suppress all evidence that the police had obtained

from his cell phone. The trial court denied the motion, and Riley was

convicted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed.

In No. 13–212, respondent Wurie was arrested after police ob-

served him participate in an apparent drug sale. At the police sta-

tion, the officers seized a cell phone from Wurie’s person and noticed

that the phone was receiving multiple calls from a source identified

as “my house” on its external screen. The officers opened the phone,

accessed its call log, determined the number associated with the “my

house” label, and traced that number to what they suspected was

Wurie’s apartment. They secured a search warrant and found drugs,

a firearm and ammunition, and cash in the ensuing search. Wurie

was then charged with drug and firearm offenses. He moved to sup-

press the evidence obtained from the search of the apartment. The

District Court denied the motion, and Wurie was convicted. The

——————

*Together with No. 13–212, United States v. Wurie, on certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

2 RILEY v. CALIFORNIA

Syllabus

First Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and vacat-

ed the relevant convictions.

Held: The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital

information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been

arrested. Pp. 5–28.

(a) A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a spe-

cific exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See

Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___. The well-established exception

at issue here applies when a warrantless search is conducted incident

to a lawful arrest.

Three related precedents govern the extent to which officers may

search property found on or near an arrestee. Chimel v. California,

395 U. S. 752, requires that a search incident to arrest be limited to

the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, where it is justified

by the interests in officer safety and in preventing evidence destruc-

tion. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, the Court applied

the Chimel analysis to a search of a cigarette pack found on the ar-

restee’s person. It held that the risks identified in Chimel are pre-

sent in all custodial arrests, 414 U. S., at 235, even when there is no

specific concern about the loss of evidence or the threat to officers in a

particular case, id., at 236. The trilogy concludes with Arizona v.

Gant, 556 U. S. 332, which permits searches of a car where the ar-

restee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger

compartment, or where it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the

crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle, id., at 343. Pp. 5–8.

(b) The Court declines to extend Robinson’s categorical rule to

searches of data stored on cell phones. Absent more precise guidance

from the founding era, the Court generally determines whether to ex-

empt a given type of search from the warrant requirement “by as-

sessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an in-

dividual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed

for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Wyoming v.

Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300. That balance of interests supported

the search incident to arrest exception in Robinson. But a search of

digital information on a cell phone does not further the government

interests identified in Chimel, and implicates substantially greater

individual privacy interests than a brief physical search. Pp. 8–22.

(1) The digital data stored on cell phones does not present either

Chimel risk. Pp. 10–15.

(i) Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a

weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s es-

cape. Officers may examine the phone’s physical aspects to ensure

that it will not be used as a weapon, but the data on the phone can

endanger no one. To the extent that a search of cell phone data

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3

Syllabus

might warn officers of an impending danger, e.g., that the arrestee’s

confederates are headed to the scene, such a concern is better ad-

dressed through consideration of case-specific exceptions to the war-

rant requirement, such as exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Warden,

Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298–299. Pp. 10–12.

(ii) The United States and California raise concerns about the

destruction of evidence, arguing that, even if the cell phone is physi-

cally secure, information on the cell phone remains vulnerable to re-

mote wiping and data encryption. As an initial matter, those broad

concerns are distinct from Chimel’s focus on a defendant who re-

sponds to arrest by trying to conceal or destroy evidence within his

reach. The briefing also gives little indication that either problem is

prevalent or that the opportunity to perform a search incident to ar-

rest would be an effective solution. And, at least as to remote wiping,

law enforcement currently has some technologies of its own for com-

batting the loss of evidence. Finally, law enforcement’s remaining

concerns in a particular case might be addressed by responding in a

targeted manner to urgent threats of remote wiping, see Missouri v.

McNeely, 569 U. S. ___, ___, or by taking action to disable a phone’s

locking mechanism in order to secure the scene, see Illinois v. McAr-

thur, 531 U. S. 326, 331–333. Pp. 12–15.

(2) A conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s

pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond

the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physical items, but

more substantial privacy interests are at stake when digital data is

involved. Pp. 15–22.

(i) Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative

sense from other objects that might be carried on an arrestee’s per-

son. Notably, modern cell phones have an immense storage capacity.

Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical reali-

ties and generally constituted only a narrow intrusion on privacy.

But cell phones can store millions of pages of text, thousands of pic-

tures, or hundreds of videos. This has several interrelated privacy

consequences. First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct

types of information that reveal much more in combination than any

isolated record. Second, the phone’s capacity allows even just one

type of information to convey far more than previously possible.

Third, data on the phone can date back for years. In addition, an el-

ement of pervasiveness characterizes cell phones but not physical

records. A decade ago officers might have occasionally stumbled

across a highly personal item such as a diary, but today many of the

more than 90% of American adults who own cell phones keep on their

person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives. Pp. 17–

21.

4 RILEY v. CALIFORNIA

Syllabus

(ii) The scope of the privacy interests at stake is further com-

plicated by the fact that the data viewed on many modern cell phones

may in fact be stored on a remote server. Thus, a search may extend

well beyond papers and effects in the physical proximity of an ar-

restee, a concern that the United States recognizes but cannot defini-

tively foreclose. Pp. 21–22.

(c) Fallback options offered by the United States and California are

flawed and contravene this Court’s general preference to provide

clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules. See

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 705, n. 19. One possible rule is

to import the Gant standard from the vehicle context and allow a

warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone whenever it is reason-

able to believe that the phone contains evidence of the crime of ar-

rest. That proposal is not appropriate in this context, and would

prove no practical limit at all when it comes to cell phone searches.

Another possible rule is to restrict the scope of a cell phone search to

information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or officer

safety. That proposal would again impose few meaningful con-

straints on officers. Finally, California suggests an analogue rule,

under which officers could search cell phone data if they could have

obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart. That

proposal would allow law enforcement to search a broad range of

items contained on a phone even though people would be unlikely to

carry such a variety of information in physical form, and would

launch courts on a difficult line-drawing expedition to determine

which digital files are comparable to physical records. Pp. 22–25.

(d) It is true that this decision will have some impact on the ability

of law enforcement to combat crime. But the Court’s holding is not

that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is that

a warrant is generally required before a search. The warrant re-

quirement is an important component of the Court’s Fourth Amend-

ment jurisprudence, and warrants may be obtained with increasing

efficiency. In addition, although the search incident to arrest excep-

tion does not apply to cell phones, the continued availability of the ex-

igent circumstances exception may give law enforcement a justifica-

tion for a warrantless search in particular cases. Pp. 25–27.

No. 13–132, reversed and remanded; No. 13–212, 728 F. 3d 1, affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA,

KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,

joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment.

_________________

_________________

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 13–132 and 13–212

DAVID LEON RILEY, PETITIONER

13–132 v.

CALIFORNIA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALI-

FORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

13–212 v.

BRIMA WURIE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2014]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the

Court.

These two cases raise a common question: whether the

police may, without a warrant, search digital information

on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been

arrested.

I

A

In the first case, petitioner David Riley was stopped by a

police officer for driving with expired registration tags. In

the course of the stop, the officer also learned that Riley’s

license had been suspended. The officer impounded Ri-

ley’s car, pursuant to department policy, and another

2 RILEY v. CALIFORNIA

Opinion of the Court

officer conducted an inventory search of the car. Riley was

arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms

when that search turned up two handguns under the car’s

hood. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§12025(a)(1), 12031(a)(1)

(West 2009).

An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and

found items associated with the “Bloods” street gang. He

also seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket. Accord-

ing to Riley’s uncontradicted assertion, the phone was a

“smart phone,” a cell phone with a broad range of other

functions based on advanced computing capability, large

storage capacity, and Internet connectivity. The officer

accessed information on the phone and noticed that some

words (presumably in text messages or a contacts list)

were preceded by the letters “CK”—a label that, he be-

lieved, stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for members

of the Bloods gang.

At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a

detective specializing in gangs further examined the con-

tents of the phone. The detective testified that he “went

through” Riley’s phone “looking for evidence, because . . .

gang members will often video themselves with guns or

take pictures of themselves with the guns.” App. in No.

13–132, p. 20. Although there was “a lot of stuff ” on the

phone, particular files that “caught [the detective’s] eye”

included videos of young men sparring while someone

yelled encouragement using the moniker “Blood.” Id., at

11–13. The police also found photographs of Riley stand-

ing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in a

shooting a few weeks earlier.

Riley was ultimately charged, in connection with that

earlier shooting, with firing at an occupied vehicle, assault

with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder.

The State alleged that Riley had committed those crimes

for the benefit of a criminal street gang, an aggravating

factor that carries an enhanced sentence. Compare Cal.

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3

Opinion of the Court

Penal Code Ann. §246 (2008) with §186.22(b)(4)(B) (2014).

Prior to trial, Riley moved to suppress all evidence that

the police had obtained from his cell phone. He contended

that the searches of his phone violated the Fourth

Amendment, because they had been performed without a

warrant and were not otherwise justified by exigent cir-

cumstances. The trial court rejected that argument. App.

in No. 13–132, at 24, 26. At Riley’s trial, police officers

testified about the photographs and videos found on the

phone, and some of the photographs were admitted into

evidence. Riley was convicted on all three counts and

received an enhanced sentence of 15 years to life in prison.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed. No. D059840

(Cal. App., Feb. 8, 2013), App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 13–

132, pp. 1a–23a. The court relied on the California Su-

preme Court’s decision in People v. Diaz, 51 Cal. 4th 84,

244 P. 3d 501 (2011), which held that the Fourth Amend-

ment permits a warrantless search of cell phone data

incident to an arrest, so long as the cell phone was imme-

diately associated with the arrestee’s person. See id., at

93, 244 P. 3d, at 505–506.

The California Supreme Court denied Riley’s petition for

review, App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 13–132, at 24a, and we

granted certiorari, 571 U. S. ___ (2014).

B

In the second case, a police officer performing routine

surveillance observed respondent Brima Wurie make an

apparent drug sale from a car. Officers subsequently

arrested Wurie and took him to the police station. At the

station, the officers seized two cell phones from Wurie’s

person. The one at issue here was a “flip phone,” a kind of

phone that is flipped open for use and that generally has a

smaller range of features than a smart phone. Five to ten

minutes after arriving at the station, the officers noticed

that the phone was repeatedly receiving calls from a

4 RILEY v. CALIFORNIA

Opinion of the Court

source identified as “my house” on the phone’s external

screen. A few minutes later, they opened the phone and

saw a photograph of a woman and a baby set as the

phone’s wallpaper. They pressed one button on the phone

to access its call log, then another button to determine the

phone number associated with the “my house” label. They

next used an online phone directory to trace that phone

number to an apartment building.

When the officers went to the building, they saw Wurie’s

name on a mailbox and observed through a window a

woman who resembled the woman in the photograph on

Wurie’s phone. They secured the apartment while obtain-

ing a search warrant and, upon later executing the war-

rant, found and seized 215 grams of crack cocaine, mari-

juana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and

cash.

Wurie was charged with distributing crack cocaine,

possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and

being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

See 18 U. S. C. §922(g); 21 U. S. C. §841(a). He moved to

suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the

apartment, arguing that it was the fruit of an unconstitu-

tional search of his cell phone. The District Court denied

the motion. 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (Mass. 2009). Wurie was

convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 262 months

in prison.

A divided panel of the First Circuit reversed the denial

of Wurie’s motion to suppress and vacated Wurie’s convic-

tions for possession with intent to distribute and posses-

sion of a firearm as a felon. 728 F. 3d 1 (2013). The court

held that cell phones are distinct from other physical

possessions that may be searched incident to arrest with-

out a warrant, because of the amount of personal data cell

phones contain and the negligible threat they pose to law

enforcement interests. See id., at 8–11.

We granted certiorari. 571 U. S. ___ (2014).

Cite as: 573 U. S.